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BOOK REVIEW
FELIX COHEN, ANTI-SEMITISM AND AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW
Kevin K. Washburn*
Architect of Justice: Felix S. Cohen and the Founding of American Legal
Pluralism. By Dalia Tsuk Mitchell. Ithaca and London: Cornell Univ. Press.
2007. Pp. xi, 368.
Introduction
On the morning of Wednesday, November 1, 1939, a bright young
government lawyer who had been detailed to the United States Department of
Justice was summoned to his supervisor's conference room. When he arrived,
Felix S. Cohen found not only his boss, Assistant Attorney General Norman
Littell, but also the entire editorial staff of the recently launched Indian Law
Survey, for which he was serving as chief. The purpose of this unusual
meeting soon became apparent to everyone in the room. Assistant Attorney
General Littell announced Cohen's termination as head of the Indian Law
Survey and ordered the members of Cohen's legal staff transferred to scattered
units of the Department of Justice.' Cohen finished the term of his special
detail at the Department of Justice performing clerical duties, such as copying
© 2009 Kevin K. Washburn
* 2007-08 Oneida Nation Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Dean and
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Washburn, Carol Rose, Laura Seigle, Joseph Singer, and especially Carole Goldberg, for
discussing with me some of the ideas discussed herein, and to Professors Christian W.
McMillen, Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, and David Wilkins, for producing such thought-provoking
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1. Memorandum from Felix Cohen, Assistant Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of Interior, to the
Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of Interior 2 (Feb. 10, 1940) [hereinafter Memorandum for the Solicitor]
(box 12/folder 169) (on file with the American Indian Law Review). This document is part of
a collection titled "The Private Papers of Felix S. Cohen" housed in the Yale Collection of
Western Americana, at the Bienecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library at Yale University in
New Haven, Connecticut. Documents from this collection will be cited hereinafter as "Cohen
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and filing, and then returned to his regular position as Associate Solicitor for
Indian Affairs at the United States Department of the Interior.2
The firing of Cohen ended the Department of Justice's participation in the
development of the Handbook of Federal Indian Law and temporarily brought
the project to a standstill. It did not, however, end the project. When Cohen
left Justice and returned to Interior, he asked his supervisors for resources to
finish the job. He then pursued the project with a vengeance, eventually
completing the work under the imprint of the Department of the Interior. The
work became the Handbook of Federal Indian Law. In its original form and
in its ensuing editions, it has been cited dozens of times by the U.S. Supreme
Court and is still relevant today. It was cited several times in last term's
opinion in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Company,
Inc., issued in June 2008. 3
If the Department of Justice had succeeded in blocking the Indian Law
Survey, the field of federal Indian law might look dramatically different today.
Despite being a non-Indian, Cohen has become one of the central figures in the
development of federal Indian law and in tribal law as well. The theoretical
structure presented in his Handbook has been influential in charting the path
of Indian law in the federal courts through much of the twentieth century, and
he drafted tribal constitutions that have endured for decades.
So while Felix Cohen died an untimely death in 1953 at the age of forty-six,
his legacy is very much alive in the law. In 2005, his Handbook was revised
and republished a third time (or fourth or even fifth, depending on how one
counts the intervening editions),4 and two recent books have been published
on Cohen and his work. One is an intellectual biography titled Architect of
Justice: Felix S. Cohen and the Founding of American Legal Pluralism by
2. Id. at 3. Cohen, who was classified as a "senior attorney" and had a $6500 salary, was
dismayed that the Assistant Attorney General asked him to spend the remainder of his time at
the Department performing tasks normally completed by a $2600 clerk.
3. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008)
(holding that a tribal court lacked jurisdiction over transactions involving non-Indian fee lands
within a reservation).
4. The Handbook was revised in 1958, 1982, and 2005. Some scholars refuse to count the
1958 revision by the Department of the Interior, which was ideologically motivated and, many
believed, bastardized Cohen's 1942 work. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy
Clausefor Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113,232 (2002) (criticizing Justice Scalia for relying
on the 1958 edition in a recent decision). On the contrary, some scholars credit a 1971 facsimile
reprint of the original 1942 work, conducted under the auspices of the American Indian Law
Center. See Margery H. Brown & Brenda C. Desmond, Montana Tribal Courts: Influencing
the Development of Contemporary Indian Law, 52 MONT. L. REV. 211, 219 n.27 (1991)




Professor Dalia Tsuk Mitchell.' The other is a reprint of one of Cohen's most
influential works on tribal law, his [Basic Memorandum] On the Drafting of
Tribal Constitutions, with a careful introduction by Professor David E.
Wilkins, a professor of American Indian Studies whose work focuses on
Indian law and politics.6 Cohen's work is also profiled in an important recent
legal-anthropological work, Making Indian Law: The Hualapai Land Case and
the Birth of Ethnohistory by Professor Christian W. McMillen,7 which
discusses the development and litigation of United States v. Santa Fe Pacific
Railroad Co.'
Felix Cohen was a complex man whose passage left mysteries, some of
which are answered, and some of which are not, by Mitchell's biography. This
review will comment on some of the insights reflected in these works and offer
some thoughts on Cohen's legacy-his continuing relevance in contemporary
developments in federal policy making and in amending tribal constitutions.
It will conclude with a discussion of the lingering questions surrounding the
motives for Cohen's firing at the Department of Justice and the effect the
firing and some of its anti-Semitic implications may have had on Cohen. It
ultimately concludes that the pervasive anti-Semitism experienced by Cohen
may have given him profound empathy with Indian tribes and their desire to
avoid assimilation. Thus, anti-Semitism may have inadvertently helped
motivate positive developments in federal Indian law.
Cohen and Indian Affairs
Cohen stumbled into Indian affairs quite unexpectedly. When Cohen
arrived at the Department of the Interior as a young man, still fairly fresh out
of law school, it had not been his life's mission to help Indian tribes.9 Indeed,
he found himself in the job with no apparent prior interest in Indian affairs.
He had never met an Indian or given the "Indian problem" a "shred of
thought."' However, Cohen was far from rudderless. He came to Indian
affairs with a highly developed world view.
5. DALIA TsuK MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OF JUSTICE: FELIX S. COHEN AND THE FOUNDING
OF AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM (2007).
6. FELIX S. COHEN, [BASIC MEMORANDUM] ON THE DRAFrING OF TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS
(David E. Wilkins ed., 2006) (1934) [hereinafter COHEN MEMORANDUM].
7. CHRISTIAN W. MCMILLEN, MAKING INDIAN LAW: THE HUALAPI LAND CASE AND THE
BIRTH OF ETHNOHISTORY 128-32, 152-54, 158-73 (2007) [hereinafter MAKING INDIAN LAW].
8. United States v. Sante Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
9. MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 63-64, 74-75.
10. MAKING INDIAN LAW, supra note 7, at 128.
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Cohen had been an unusually sophisticated student. He was raised in a
household that embodied a robust Jewish intellectual tradition of diversity and
disagreement, and he frequently engaged in debate with his father, Morris
Cohen, an ambitious academic once called "the Paul Bunyan of Jewish
Intellectuals."" After college, Cohen spent two years working toward a Ph.D.
in philosophy at Harvard before entering Columbia Law School, having
reached the "all but dissertation" stage of his Ph.D. 2 In his first year of law
school, Cohen finished his Harvard dissertation 3 and published it as a book. 4
During his time on the Columbia Law Review, he published three case notes
and two legislative comments' 5, a level of productivity unusual even at the
time.
Cohen worked briefly at a law firm before being hired at the Department of
the Interior by Solicitor Nathan Margold, an old friend of the family. 6
Reformer John Collier ran the Bureau of Indian Affairs at the time and the
New Deal was just getting under way. 7 Cohen was among a wave of
technocratic and idealistic intellectuals who would change government
forever.8 Though Cohen was still a young lawyer, he had highly sophisticated
views of the law's purpose and was working toward the development of a
broader philosophy of cultural and legal pluralism. 9 Indeed, his dissertation
had addressed this theme, albeit in a broad theoretical manner.20 Cohen's
public service gave him an opportunity to put his theoretical vision to work in
the real world.
In Mitchell's narrative, Cohen's commitment to legal pluralism made him
ideal as a reformer of Indian policy. Cohen and other progressives of the time
were concerned with two developments in the increasingly capitalistic culture
11. MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 16 (citing David A. Hollinger, Ethnic Diversity,
Cosmopolitanism and the Emergence oftheAmerican Liberal Intelligentsia, 27 AM. Q. 133,139
(1975)).
12. Id. at 42, 47.
13. Id. at 47.
14. FELIX COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS: AN ESSAY ON THE FOUNDATIONS
OF LEGAL CRITICISM (1933).
15. MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 42.
16. Id. at 63.
17. Id. at 64-65.
18. An important biography of another of the members of the so-called New Deal "brain-
trust" is ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK'S IMPACT
ON AMERICAN LAW (1985).
19. MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 75-77. The philosophy was reflected in Cohen's
dissertation. See generally id. at 63-64, 74-75.




of the twentieth century: the accelerating consolidation of disparate business
enterprises into single entities and the heavy concentration of these single
entities-known at the time as "trusts"-into the hands of a shrinking pool of
wealthy individuals.2 ' Cohen saw Indian tribes as a refreshing contrast. In his
view, they were egalitarian entities, more like labor unions. He appreciated
their collective forms of ownership, viewing their structures as obstacles to
concentrations of wealth and economic power.2 In short, "Cohen believed
that Indian reservations held a promise for a better national future-a future
that would implement his legal pluralist vision."23 Conversely, Cohen was
also skeptical of efforts to assimilate Indians, viewing assimilation as "cultural
death. 24
Cohen and Tribal Consultation
Cohen's first major imprint on federal Indian law was his assistance in
drafting, lobbying for, and then implementing the Indian Reorganization Act
(IRA), a federal law enacted in 1934 to modernize and transform tribes by
encouraging them to adopt constitutional forms of government. It is also, in
some ways, his most enduring legacy, though not always a good one.
Only a person deeply committed to pluralism could have appreciated the job
ahead of Cohen when he joined the Department of the Interior. Federal
officials who encounter Indian tribes and the vast diversity in tribal viewpoints
sometimes find the nuance and complexity of Indian affairs maddening and
succumb to frustration.25 From the beginning of the drafting stages of the IRA,
Cohen wrestled with questions of how much to include tribal leaders in
discussions of federal Indian policy making, a practice now widely followed
in the federal government and commonly known as "tribal consultation."
21. Id. at 74-76.
22. Id. at 74.
23. Id.
24. MAKING INDIAN LAW, supra note 7, at 128.
25. One recent example of this phenomenon is Associate Deputy Secretary of the
Department of the Interior James Cason's speech at the Federal Bar Association meeting in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, on Thursday, April 19, 2007. Cason vented frustration at tribal
attorneys for filing hundreds of applications seeking to place Indian land into trust while
simultaneously criticizing the Department of the Interior and suing the agency for
mismanagement of Indian trust lands. Cason Explains Misgivings on Land-into-Trust,
INDIANZ.COM, Apr. 20, 2007, http://www.indianz.com/news/2007/002514.asp. Surely Cason
knew there were regulatory benefits to having tribal land held in trust. Namely, protection from
state and local taxation, but his (nevertheless understandable) aggravation with the constant
criticism of the BIA led him to dissemble in front of a large crowd.
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
To provide a sense of how much tribal consultation has developed since
Cohen's time, the IRA was drafted at a time when consultation with tribes
occurred through Indian agents assigned to the reservations. Now, tribes are
represented by strong national pan-tribal organizations, such as the National
Congress of American Indians, the National Indian Gaming Association, and
other regional or subject-specific organizations, many with offices in
Washington, D.C. They also have Washington-based lawyers and lobbyists
keeping vigilant watch for congressional or other federal action on tribal
issues. Thus, today tribal views do not arrive in Washington having been
filtered by lower-level federal officials. Tribal views are made known directly.
A man ahead of his time, Cohen insisted on tribal consultation on tribal
policy and convinced Collier that it was crucial to seek tribal input before
sending a draft bill to Congress.26 In some ways, Cohen was merely being
pragmatic. Even then, tribal consultation was politically necessary because
Congress was unlikely to enact a bill without considerable tribal support.27 He
also argued that consultation was substantively important to the success of the
initiative because Interior would need concrete assistance from tribes in
working out the details of reorganization.28
Such participation by interested parties was a hallmark of technocratic
governance, and the New Deal reforms eventually led to formal codification
of such responsibilities, at least in the agency arena, in the Administrative
Procedure Act.29 Today it is apparent that one of the signal achievements of
the twentieth century was the growth of innovative and less formal methods
of public participation in governance. Most federal law making or agency rule
making today involves significant consultation with affected interests.30
While consultation with affected parties is now a hallmark of federal
administrative policy making, there is an even greater responsibility for
consultation with Indian tribes. Most everyone familiar with the unique
political relationship between tribes and the federal government agrees that
federal policy makers have a special responsibility to consult with tribal
governments early and often in the development of Indian policy. Indeed, it
is the official position of Congress and countless government agencies. 3
26. MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 95.
27. Id. Mitchell suggests there was tension between Cohen and Collier as to whether tribal
consultation was sensible.
28. Id.
29. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
5 U.S.C.).
30. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).




Despite the wide agreement about the need for consultation, the
responsibility to consult with tribes has been a constant challenge for federal
Indian policy makers. To formalize the responsibility, a bill was introduced
in the last Congress to force the executive branch to engage in tribal
consultation when it develops agency policy.32
Most federal officials agree they must consult early and often with tribal
governments as to federal Indian policy. One question that frequently arises,
however, is "how early and how often?" A consultation policy that merely
gives Indian tribes the same public commenting rights as any individual
member of the public at the notice and comment stage of a BIA rule making
renders the unique legal and political relationship between tribes and the
federal government meaningless. A true government-to-government approach
to consultation would respect tribes' rights and authority in developing federal
policy, and tribes would be involved at a meaningful time in the formation of
that policy. One could make a credible argument that Congress and the
Executive ought not treat comments from states, which also have a unique
political and legal relationship with the federal government, in the same
manner as comments from individual members of the public. Neither should
this be the case for Indian tribes whose governmental status is acknowledged
and preserved in treaties, executive orders, federal legislation, and the U.S.
Constitution. Yet in contrast to states, which have a single document and
coherent body of doctrine that describes their structural relationship with the
United States, each individual tribe has a unique relationship with the federal
government as defined in legislation and treaties.33 Hence the compelling need
for increased consultation with and greater opportunity for tribal comments.
The complexity of tribal-federal relations has created circumstances in which
federal Indian policy making may well have more fits and starts-more
amendments to proposed rules, more extensions of times for comment, and
more failed rule makings-than virtually any field of federal agency law.34
numerous sub-cabinet level agencies and branches, from the obvious ones like the Indian Health
Service to many others such as the IRS and the Army Corps of Engineers. One law firm has
collected thirty-five such policies and has posted them online. See Orders and Policies
Regarding Consultation with Indian Tribes, http://www.schlosserlawfiles.com/consult/Policies
ReConsult%20w-IndianTribe.htm (last visited June 28, 2009).
32. Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments Act, H.R. Res. 5608,
110th Cong. (2008). A hearing on the bill occurred in the last Congress on April 9, 2008.
33. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism,
and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993).
34. This is a guess; the author is a professor of administrative law and a former general
counsel of a federal agency.
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So while the dynamics of consultation have changed a great deal since
Cohen's time (today many of the key federal Indian policy makers are Indian
people), there remains a compelling need for more meaningful consultation
with tribes as policy, laws, and rules are developed. Continuing to staff these
positions with thoughtful people, especially Indian people who have a
comparative advantage in intuiting tribal concerns, is a good start.
Ironically, today the consultation process may be much stronger in the
Executive Branch than in Congress. Executive officials are generally inclined
to provide opportunities for tribes to be heard in a consultative process. They
understand that if they fail to provide such opportunities, they may well be
dragged before Congress and publicly criticized for the lack of such process.
To their chagrin, such criticism has no payoff to the policy making process,
because it gives members of Congress or Senators an opportunity to score
political points without the risk that accompanies going on record about the
substance of the policy produced.
Congress, on the other hand, has several tricks up its sleeve through the
midnight rider and the appropriation processes that allow it to make policy
without engaging in any consultation at all. Rarely does Congress make broad
policy in such a manner, but the unsophisticated are sometimes surprised with
the outcomes. On the contrary, even those disgruntled by Executive decisions
will have little cause for complaints about notice-they often will have seen
the policy coming for years and will have discussed it extensively with
government officials.
Where consultation occurs as it should, the challenges nevertheless are very
real. No sensible and self-respecting policy maker should be willing to share
a draft proposal with the public before it has been developed internally and
taken shape into a fully formed idea. If consultation was required any time a
federal official had a partially formulated idea while taking a shower or driving
in during the morning commute, an official would never be able to take any
action or develop ideas fully. Thus, while federal Indian affairs officials
should consult informally as an idea develops, and should consult widely
before an idea becomes firmly rooted, federal officials must have some limited
and protected space in which they can think about their responsibilities and
how to meet them. If we do not allow federal officials to have ideas that are
developed in advance of the consultation process, federal policy development
in Indian country will atrophy.
In Mitchell's portrait, Cohen seems to have encountered the same diversity




often even endured direct criticism,35 but he seems to have taken this in stride
and avoided significant frustration. Cohen was well-suited to the work, both
philosophically and as a matter of personality. His personal comfort with
respectful disagreement is apparent in his complicated and deeply intellectual
relationship with his father.36 Likewise, his deeply embedded legal philosophy
and pluralist agenda also counseled respect for divergent views expressed by
others.37 Indeed, it is hard to imagine a non-Indian philosophy more capable
of being respectful of tribal autonomy than Cohen's. Cohen was thus perhaps
uniquely suited to help transform federal Indian policy in a manner more
respectful of tribes as governments. In short, Cohen, the New Deal, and Indian
affairs constituted the perfect convergence of the right person at the right place
in the right moment in history to set the United States on a new course in
dealing with tribes that would accommodate diverse tribal viewpoints in the
development of Indian policy.
Cohen's Paradox
For all its benefits to tribes, however, Cohen's pluralist agenda sometimes
clearly overcame his vision of tribal self-determination. This happened in
numerous small ways during the drafting and implementation of the IRA. For
example, for purposes of voting on the adoption of IRA constitutions, Interior
seems to have divorced voting rights from tribal membership. This was
probably done in an effort to expand the vote among a wider class of Indians,
thereby diluting the power of the full-blooded traditional Indians who were
resistant to broad innovations in tribal governance.38
Cohen's visions for cultural pluralism and tribal self-determination were
also sometimes sacrificed to a third interest: political expediency. The IRA
was enacted at a time of transition and uncertainty in Indian policy, and no
doubt some naysayers would have preferred not to proceed down a path that
served to preserve and acknowledge inherent tribal governmental powers.
Thus, Cohen felt an urgent-and politically pragmatic-need to prove swiftly
the success of the IRA.39 There is some evidence that this strategy was
effective. While opposition from Oklahoma tribes and by the Oklahoma
congressional delegation resulted in the IRA being amended before final
passage to exclude the Oklahoma tribes, the fragile legislative coalition in
35. See generally MrrCHELL, supra note 5, at 96-98, 107-08.
36. See generally id. at 11-30.
37. Id. at 28.
38. Id. at 109-11.
39. Id. at 103-09.
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favor of the IRA held. In the very next Congress, a law was enacted that
adopted a similar framework for the Oklahoma tribes." As an epilogue that
will seem familiar to any Indian policy maker today, the New Deal Congress
seemed far more willing to adopt reforms supportive of tribal governments
than to appropriate funds to help pay for them."
In the area of tribal constitutions, Cohen is a paradoxical figure. Though
Cohen is perhaps best known for his work in producing the Handbook of
Federal Indian Law, which is discussed in greater detail below,42 his most
stubborn legacy was his work in helping draft the IRA constitutions that
continue to govern many tribes today. It is because of these constitutions that
Cohen remains a highly controversial figure in federal Indian law. For while
the Handbook has been revised, many tribal constitutions have been
stubbornly resistant to change.
Cohen's paradox, which is raised directly in Architect of Justice and
partially answered there and in the Cohen Memorandum, is this: with more
than a hundred IRA tribal constitutions in existence across the country, there
is a claim widely repeated in scholarly literature that Cohen's IRA
constitutions contained "boilerplate" provisions that were not differentiated by
tribe.43 This has long troubled Indian law scholars. If Cohen was truly a
"legal pluralist," why are tribal constitutions not more reflective of organic
tribal traditions of governments? How can it be that so many tribes have
"boilerplate" constitutions?
The paradox is quite real. While Cohen insisted that "[the] tribes should
write their own constitutions,"44 the Cohen Memorandum was an influential
memo that identified the elements that should be included. Though Cohen
apparently believed the Bureau of Indian Affairs should provide only technical
assistance, a committee at Interior also apparently prepared a "model" tribal
constitution.45
40. Id. at 108 (alluding to the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 503 (2006)).
41. Id. at 105.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 56-88.
43. Frank Pommersheim, LookingForwardandLooking Back: The Promise andPotential
of a Sioux Nation Judicial Support Center and Sioux Nation Supreme Court, 34 ARIz. ST. L.J.
269, 284 (2002); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal
Courts, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 671, 712 (1989); Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107
COLuM. L. REv. 1049, 1076-77 (2007).
44. MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 106.




It should be no surprise that Cohen's work in this area is controversial.
Drafting a constitution is assuredly one of the most controversial activities one
can undertake on behalf of any government. Americans even today continue
to debate Madison and Hamiltonian views. Since a new constitution has the
power to fundamentally change a tribal government, it is an inherently political
process. A poorly drawn tribal constitution can tie a tribe in political knots
that can prevent effective governance and stymie economic development. In
the name of fairness and the rule of law, a tribal constitution can undermine
fluidity and flexibility in tribal government and impose instead a strict
formalism. It also has the power to entrench existing political factions and,
like the Constitution of the United States, undermine majority rights.
Consider, for example, the Constitution of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe,
which created a confederation of several different tribal bands.' Each of the
six bands of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe has two delegates to the overall
tribal executive committee.47 The White Earth Band, which has in excess of
20,000 members, 48 argues that it is unfair that it has no more delegates than the
Grand Portage Band, which has well under a thousand members.49 Though
White Earth tribal chairwoman Erma Vizenor has called for constitutional
reform,5° she has not been successful in obtaining action. It is not an unusual
problem. One can imagine California5 making a very similar complaint about
North Dakota 2 regarding representation in the United States Senate.
Constitutions are designed to preserve formal structures, whether they are
46. REVISED CONST. AND BYLAws OF THE MINN. CHIPPEWA TRIBE, available at
http://thorpe.ou.edu/constitution/chippewa/index.html.
47. Id. art. III, § 1.
48. See White Earth Band ofChippewa, http://www.kstrom.net/isk/maps/mn/whitearth.htm
(last visited June 28, 2009).
49. See Official Website of the Grand Portage Band, http://www.grandportage.com/
community.html (last visited June 28,2009) ("The Grand Portage Community has a population
of 518 people, of which half are enrolled members of the Grand Portage Band."); see also
Grand Portage Band of Chippewa Indians, http://www.kstrom.net/isk/maps/mn/grandport.htm
(last visited June 28, 2009) (noting a reservation population of 308 and a total enrollment of
790).
50. David Melmer, Vizenor Wins White Earth Chair, INDIAN CouNTRY TODAY, June 28,
2004, available at http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/archive/28175234.html.
51. The population of California is roughly 34 million. Census 2000 Data for the State of
California, http://www.census.gov/census2000/states/ca.html (last visited June 28, 2009).
52. The population of North Dakota is roughly 642,200. Census 2000 Data for the State of
North Dakota, http://www.census.gov/census2000/states/nd.html (last visited June 28, 2009).
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democratically fair or not. Constitutional reform is, thus, a matter involving
tremendously high stakes and inherent controversy.53
Explanations for the gap between Cohen's philosophy of cultural pluralism
and the perceived similarity of the constitutions that came out of the IRA
drafting process is illuminated by both Mitchell's biography and by the Cohen
Memorandum.
One way Cohen sacrificed his own cultural pluralist agenda to political
expediency was to rush tribes through the constitution-drafting process.
Cohen sought to insure that when Congress came back in session the following
year, he would be able to demonstrate that the IRA had been a successful
initiative.' I am told by people who regularly perform this kind of work,
scholars and attorneys such as Carole Goldberg, Duane Champagne, Richard
Monette, Robert Lytle, and others, that effective revision is necessarily time-
consuming and rushing the process is anathema to good results.
Another problem was the natural legal dynamic that comes with federal
review of tribal decision making. Once the Secretary had approved a tribal
constitution, for example, a cautious drafter for another tribe would be more
likely to recommend that form because there was no doubt it would be
approved." According to Mitchell, "[t]he outcome was a multiplicity of
similar constitutions."56  Thus, the centralized decision-making structure
suffocated Cohen's own pluralist inclinations.
Professor Wilkins discusses this paradox in his introduction to the Cohen
Memorandum. He suggests that Cohen was disturbed about this uniformity
and troubled about the lack of meaningful self-government reflected in such
a process." Yet despite these misgivings, he vigorously pursued the
constitutional development initiative and remained deeply committed to
proving its success. The ends-the survival of the IRA initiative and
congressional support of tribal governance generally-seemed to justify the
means. Hence, tribal constitutions were drafted in a hasty manner with little
effort made to preserve organic tribal processes. While the IRA thus helped
to preserve the platonic notion of tribal governance, it necessarily
53. See, e.g., Richard Monette Fired as Constitutional Attorney, SAULT TRIBE TIMES, May
23, 2007, available at http://saulttribetimes.com/news/index.php?option=com-content&task=
view&id=299&Itemid=50.
54. MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 105, 108.
55. Id. at 107.
56. Id.
57. COHEN MEMORANDUM, supra note 6, at xxviii.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol33/iss2/7
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substantively changed tribal governments and helped displace and smother
traditional tribal governance.
Only in recent years have scholars effectively begun to survey the damage.
The outcome of the IRA constitutional development process was not only
harmful to tribal traditions, it may have also handicapped tribes' ability to
succeed politically and economically.5" Professors Joe Kalt and Stephen
Cornell of the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development
theorize that a tribe cannot thrive without a system of self-governance that
matches its cultural values. The Kalt-Cornell Theorem suggests that there
must be a "cultural match" between the tribe and its governmental structure.59
For many tribes, this "match" is lacking under current IRA constitutions.'
Assuming this compelling theory is true, there are nevertheless substantial
obstacles to creating cultural match. How does one determine what kind of
institutional structure best matches cultural norms? Coming at it from the
other direction, how does one reduce cultural processes to written
descriptions? The challenges are immense.
Finding cultural match may also be undermined by simple lawyerly norms.
Consider the personal dynamics at play when tribal constitutions were drafted.
No lawyer would want to be associated with a failed effort, a constitution
agreed upon by the tribe and then rejected by the BIA. BIA disapproval would
embarrass the tribe and its lawyer. Indeed, the tribe may question the value of
an attorney who cannot predict the behavior of the BIA. Ordinary practical
norms of lawyering suggest that it would thus have been sensible and prudent
to recommend language that had already been reviewed and approved by the
BIA. Inertia thus serves as a powerful force toward uniformity. Indeed, this
58. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances for
Economic Development on American Indian Reservations, in WHAT CAN TRIBES Do?
STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 15-18 (Stephen Comell
& Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1992), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hpaied/docs/
reloading%20the%20dice.pdf, reprinted in STEPHEN CORNELL& JOSEPH P. KALT, RELOADING
THE DICE: IMPROVING THE CHANCES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON AMERICAN INDIAN
RESERVATIONS 18-21 (Native Nations Inst. & Harvard Project on Am. Indian Econ. Dev., Joint
Occasional Papers on Native Affairs, No. 2003-02, 2003) available at http://www.jopna.net/
pubs/jopna_2003-02_Dice.pdf.
59. Id. This theorem was first articulated by the Project in Reloading the Dice, but has
continued to carry through the Project's work. It is discussed at length in the following texts:
HARVARD PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV., THE STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS:
CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 125-26 (2008); REBUILDING
NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 47-52 (Miriam Jorgensen
ed., 2007).
60. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 58, at 18-21.
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is why lawyers are a powerful normative force preserving the rule of law. The
fundamental problem with this practical approach to lawyering, of course, is
that it elevates expediency above traditional tribal values.
The BIA's influence toward uniformity today is less powerful than it was
in the past. In most cases, the BIA no longer has the right to disapprove tribal
constitutions unless they conflict directly with federal law, but the issue still
arises in myriad circumstances in tribal policy making. For example, no tribe
can engage in Indian gaming without first obtaining the approval of the
National Indian Gaming Commission for its tribal gaming ordinance.6'
Thus, like the consultation issue discussed above, the dilemma Cohen faced
is common even today in the field of Indian law. Any lawyer who has ever
worked closely with a tribal government can understand the inherent
challenges. When a tribe embarks on drafting a tribal constitution and is
wrestling with constitutional language, consider the challenging questions
facing the outside attorney: what is the appropriate role of the outside lawyer?
Should she give her best advice as to the provisions, no matter that it is
burdened with significant normative assumptions? Should she simply stand
with her arms crossed and refuse to help? Or should she try a middle ground
and devise a menu of choices ("If you are interested in true democracy, choose
option A; if you prefer a more representative style of democratic governance,
choose option B; if you prefer a strong central leader model, choose option C,"
etc.)? The multiple choice model seems largely to be the approach used by
Cohen in his Memorandum. While it gives the illusion of self-determination,
it does not create organically generated solutions but offers choices between
pre-determined ones.
Formulating constitutions by attempting to describe existing traditional
practices likely is a more fruitful approach, but it is also much more
challenging. It may take a very talented lawyer to accurately reduce a
traditional governance structure to a written constitutional form. It might also
be difficult for a lawyer to keep her own normative judgments out of the
analysis.
Moreover, drafting constitutions is inherently problematic. A constitutional
government is necessarily more resistant to governmental fluidity and
evolution. Constitutional theorists have struggled for years with the inherent
conflict between constitutional governance and democratic governance, with
constitutional governance reflecting adherence to the views of the dead and




democratic governance more attuned to the needs of the living. It is thus an
open question whether tribes should want constitutions at all.
Ironically, one reason the republication by Wilkins of the Cohen
Memorandum62 is so important is that it may assist in constitutional
interpretation, a fact that is necessarily in tension with Cohen's pluralistic
ideals. Indeed, the Memorandum may be much more than a historical artifact.
For better or worse, it may be a significant piece of legislative history that
ought to help guide our interpretation of tribal constitutions. Mitchell's
portrait suggests that Cohen likely would have wanted a different result.
So, why does such a memorandum exist? History suggests, once again, that
it was driven by political expediency. Despite his pluralist intentions, Cohen
could not have possibly traveled in person to each of the reservations where
constitutional reform was occurring. At the time of the IRA's enactment, there
were few to no lawyers who were also tribal members,6 s so a lawyer providing
guidance would necessarily have been an outsider. Local BIA officials, who
would naturally have been part of the process on the reservation, likely would
not have been law trained either. Those BIA officials likely craved guidance
themselves. Moreover, it may be that few of these local BIA officials shared
Cohen's ideal of tribal self-determination or appreciated the need for
constitution-making to be a tribally generative process. Since the IRA made
the process inevitable, perhaps the blame is more appropriately directed at an
earlier action, the enactment of the IRA, which forced the speedy development
of tribal constitutions. Cohen would nevertheless bear responsibility, for he
was also the chief architect of the IRA.6
On balance, as an unlikely federal legislative re-affirmance of the principle
of tribal sovereignty and self-determination, the IRA may have done
substantial good that offsets the harm that it caused. Yet it is impossible to be
certain because such an assessment requires imagining a world without the
IRA. In sum, Cohen's work in the area of tribal constitutions seems to reflect
an extreme example of good intentions never having been realized.
One very real tragedy is that Cohen's tribal constitutions have proven
remarkably durable. Though the IRA itself has been amended to remove the
62. See, e.g., COHEN MEMORANDUM, supra note 6, § 9, at 37-39 (entitled "The Place of
Chiefs in Tribal Government" in which Cohen attempts to mediate the transition from
traditional forms of government to the IRA form).
63. See Lawrence R. Baca, Ignore the Man Behind the Curtain: A Brief History of Thirty
Years ofthe Indian Law Conference, FED. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2005, at 4, 25 (there are "only 1,853
American Indian lawyers in America today... [which] is a tremendous increase over the dozen
recorded in the 1960 census .... ).
64. COHEN MEMORANDUM, supra note 6, at xix; MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 73.
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statutory requirement of federal approval of some important tribal decisions,
such as adoption of tribal ordinances or the selection of tribal legal counsel,65
many tribal constitutions still require federal approval for these same actions.
The irony here is striking. Even though Congress has amended federal laws
to make those laws less paternalistic, paternalism nevertheless continues to be
mandated by tribal constitutions. Though tribes may not like the paternalistic
constitutional provisions, many tribes seem politically unwilling to open their
constitutions for reform for other reasons. Whether the IRA constitutions were
true to tribal traditions or not, the process of constitutionalizing tribal
governments has thus had its own ramifications, sometimes making them more
rigid and less malleable to tribal needs. This has made it much more difficult
to produce the governmental reform that might be necessary to achieve the
"cultural match" suggested by Professors Kalt and Cornell.
It is unclear whether Cohen foresaw these problems. Indeed, if anything,
Cohen seems to have romanticized tribal governments. As my colleague Sam
Deloria would no doubt encourage us to recognize, not all tribal governmental
traditions are necessarily normatively healthy or "good." Thus, an even
greater paradox that Cohen avoided by providing boilerplate language was this
one: how do we account for tribal traditions we might nevertheless find
normatively repugnant? While these questions lack easy solutions, it is clear
Cohen was one of the first federal policy makers in the modem era to face
some of the challenges that would come from greater recognition of tribal self-
determination and greater tribal input in federal policy.
The Mystery at Justice
Since Cohen is the central figure in so many important issues involving
federal Indian policy, it is important to know what motivated Cohen in this
field. Why, for example, did Cohen work so hard to finish the Handbook after
being so rudely removed from the project? Here, Mitchell provides some
guidance but seems to evade the question without taking it on directly.'
65. Seegenerallythe Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934, ch. 576, § 16,48 Stat. 984,
987 (providing for secretarial review of contracts between Indian tribes and legal counsel),
repealed by Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contracts Encouragement Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-179, § 3, 114 Stat. 46, 47.
66. See, e.g., MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 64 (suggesting the attempt of Christian





It was five years after the enactment of the IRA, in 1939, that Cohen was
detailed to the Department of Justice to run the Indian Law Survey.67 At first,
Cohen sought to avoid the job.6" But because Justice agreed to bear most of
the costs, it chose the project supervisor and identified Cohen as a prime
candidate. Cohen resisted the temporary assignment to Justice, claiming at the
time it was because he enjoyed his working relationships with colleagues and
superiors at the Department of the Interior.69 Professor Philip Frickey has
offered a more compelling insight to explain Cohen's reluctance: as an
influential legal realist, Cohen's preparation of a treatise-like work seems to
be an odd and uncharacteristic embrace of legal formalism.7" Though Cohen
urged Justice Department officials to appoint someone else as Chief of the
Indian Law Survey, Cohen eventually acquiesced and was appointed to a one-
year post as Special Attorney in the Department of Justice.7 By the time
Cohen went to Justice, he was an expert on Indian tribes and had, no doubt,
developed strong views about Indian law and policy.
In Architect of Justice, Professor Mitchell skates lightly past Cohen's firing
at the Department of Justice. Professor Mitchell places the events of late 1939
in the context of a wider ideological disagreement between Cohen and his
superiors at Justice.72 In presenting the dispute as purely ideological, however,
she ignores an important mystery surrounding the motives at play at Justice.
For while the clash between Cohen and Justice was surely ideological in part,
Cohen himself believed more sinister motives were at play.
In a letter written in the spring of 1940, just a few months after the events
played out at Justice, Cohen characterized his firing and his staff's
reassignment as a "purge" and implied it was the result of anti-Semitism
within the Department of Justice.73 In the letter, Cohen carefully described the
harmful actions taken against him and four of his colleagues and staff
67. Felix Cohen, Report of Work as Chief of the Indian Law Survey: 1939-1940 (undated)
(Cohen Papers box 12/folder 169) (on file with the American Indian Law Review).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Transcendental Nonsense: Toward a New Realism in
Federal Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 649, 651-56 (2006).
71. Cohen, supra note 67, at 1-2.
72. These events are described in even greater detail in Jill E. Martin, "A Year anda Spring
of My Existence ": Felix S. Cohen and the Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 8 W. LEGAL HIST.
35 (1995).
73. Letter from Felix S. Cohen to David Shenker, Esquire (Feb. 12, 1940) [hereinafter
Cohen Letter] (Cohen Papers, box 13 / folders 176-182) (on file with the American Indian Law
Review).
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members, listing them in a manner akin to the counts in an indictment. He
concluded the letter by suggesting a "need for a careful examination of the
entire personnel situation in the Lands Division of the Department of Justice,
before critics of the Administration make a campaign incident out of these five
cases."
74
The campaign to which Cohen referred was the 1940 presidential campaign,
then underway. Whether Cohen's mention of a "campaign incident" was a
veiled threat or an innocent concern is unclear. However, the letter shows
Cohen was still deeply bothered by the events at Justice, more than three
months after they occurred. The reason this mystery is so important is that it
may help us to understand what drove Cohen as he completed the Handbook.
Was Cohen's interest in Indian law and Indian people purely platonic,
intellectual, and ideological, as Mitchell implicitly suggests, or was it driven
in part or wholly by a sense of shared experience with other oppressed
peoples?75
The ideological grounds for the disagreement were simple enough. First
were the practical needs of federal lawyering. Justice's stated goal for the
project was the creation of a litigation manual to help it win cases, which were
often against Indians and tribes. Indeed, at the time, Justice was defending the
United States in cases brought by Indian tribes in the Court of Claims asserting
claims of more than $2 billion.76 In some respects, Cohen was simply ill-
matched to the task, at least as envisioned by the Department of Justice.
Instead of a litigation manual, Cohen wanted to write with greater breadth. He
wanted to produce a work that would guide "states, fiduciaries, attorneys,
homesteaders, lessees, and contractors" as well77 and that would create a
framework for an evolving systematization of the laws and treaties that
governed this area.7" In sum, he hoped to create a book that would be as useful
outside the Department of Justice as within it. This clashed strongly with the
more targeted book Justice sought to create. Second, however, was the deeper
ideology of Indian rights. Cohen may have been too pro-Indian. He was an
74. Id. at 3.
75. Some of my own curiosity in this regard was stoked by a recent work of fiction, which
offers an account of what it might have been like to grow up Jewish in the United States under
slightly different historical circumstances. See PHIIP ROTH, THE PLOT AGAINST AMERICA
(2004). It has also been stoked by the common parlor game in Indian intellectual circles of
asking whether it is the Israeli Jews or the Palestinians whose circumstances are most akin to
the Indians.
76. MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 167.
77. Id. at 168.
78. Id. at 166-67.
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unabashed supporter of Indian rights. The Department of Justice was much
more ambivalent about the protection of tribal rights and tribal lands, even as
it was charged with acting as their trustee.79
In light of these contrasting agendas, perhaps Cohen and the Department of
Justice were destined for a clash. In a larger sense, the disagreement may have
represented the inevitable conflict between the legal advocate and the
academic. Cohen's integrity as a scholar with a particular normative view of
the field seems to have overcome his role as federal advocate. It also may
have represented the clash between the near-sighted Department of Justice
lawyer, who looks no further than the next case, and the Department of the
Interior policy maker, who must necessarily have a view longer and broader
than prevailing in the immediate litigation.
Ideological differences aside, the clash with Justice seems to have been
uglier and far more personal than a mere dispute between professionals might
otherwise have been. Cohen complained to his superiors at Interior that it was
gratuitous for the Department of Justice "to humiliate me personally before my
staff and later to attack my scholarship and my character[.]"' By most
accounts, including Cohen's, the person responsible was Assistant Attorney
General Norman Littell.8" As the head of the Lands Division, Littell took
responsibility for terminating the project and told others he was doing so
because of the "inferior quality" of the work. 2 This characterization, no
doubt, infuriated Cohen.
It was likely the personal nature of the incident that led to Cohen's
suspicions about Littell's motives.8 3 Cohen never explicitly used the words
"anti-Semitism," but by characterizing the Justice actions as a "purge,"1
Cohen's language was laden with insinuation.84 All of the staff Cohen
described as victims of the purge had Jewish surnames.8"
The historical record is unclear as to whether Cohen's grievances against
the Department of Justice were ever credited or addressed, and it is impossible
79. See, e.g., MAKING INDIAN LAW, supra note 7, at 133-52 (discussing the Department of
Justice's "anemic" efforts on behalf of the Hualapai Tribe in its case against the Santa Fe
Railroad and Assistant Attorney General Littell's firing of chief lawyer Richard Hannah in order
to take a "dive" on behalf of the government so the railroad would prevail).
80. Memorandum for the Solicitor, supra note 1.
81. Martin, supra note 72, at 44-48; MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 168-70.
82. See Martin, supra note 72, at 46-47; MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 169.
83. See Cohen Letter, supra note 73.
84. Id. at 1.
85. See id. (including Cohen himself, Abraham Glasser, Bernard Levinson, Theodore
Spector, and Jacob Wasserman).
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to know all of Littell's motives. Littell was a founding member of the
National Committee Against Persecution of the Jews, 6 but the evidence is
mixed. In personal correspondence, Littell attributed the growing tide of
American anti-Semitism during World War II to Nazi propaganda, but also to
"the merits[.]" '87 According to Littell, "the Jew, [who was] recently
emancipated from the ghetto and political restrictions is, undoubtedly, a
shrewder, more astute, and less restrained businessman than the ordinary
Anglo-Saxon."88 In a private letter contained in his biography, Littell admitted
that he could not make such a statement publicly because "it would seem to
confess the whole basis for anti-semitism (sic)."89 Littell himself was later
fired by President Roosevelt in November 1944 after an unrelated conflict with
the Attorney General. 9'
It remains uncertain what to make of Cohen's firing. There is substantial
evidence of anti-Semitism throughout the ranks of government during this
year. The New Deal brought a wave of bright young Jewish lawyers to
Washington as part of the "brain trust." The rise of influential Jewish lawyer
and legal realist Jerome Frank was stymied by President Roosevelt's own
reluctance to appoint a Jew to the D.C. Circuit in 1939, though Roosevelt later
appointed Frank to the Second Circuit.9 Anti-Semitism, and the second class
citizenship that such status created, was likely felt as a very real part of the
landscape that shaped Cohen's beliefs.
In light of the other reasons for a dispute with Cohen, anti-Semitism may
have played only a minor role in the specific decision at Justice to fire him.
But the act no doubt had a profound impact on Cohen. When the Handbook
appeared in 1941, Cohen was vindicated by its strong reviews. Even Attorney
General Robert Jackson sent congratulations and a request for a copy.92 Justice
Felix Frankfurter later praised Cohen for bringing "luminous order" out of "the
vast hodge-podge of treaties, statutes, judicial and administrative rulings, and
unrecorded practice in which the intricacies and perplexities, the confusions
and injustices of the law governing Indians lay concealed." 3
86. NORMAN M. LrrTEL, MY ROOSEVELT YEARS 220-21 (Jonathan Dembo ed., 1987).
87. Id. at 315.
88. Id.
89. Id,
90. See id. at 354.
91. GLENNON, supra note 18, at 30.
92. MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 170.
93. Felix Frankfurter, Foreword [to Symposium Issue on Felix S. Cohen], 9 RUTGERS L.




For Cohen, perhaps success was the best revenge.' The enormity of his
achievement is underscored by later efforts to update his important work.
When Congress asked the Department of the Interior to produce a new edition
of the Handbook in 1968, it took fourteen years and a slate of gifted legal
scholars to produce a revision, even though Cohen's basic structural vision had
already provided the intellectual template.95 The most recent edition, released
in 2005 and updated in 2007, took roughly twelve years, having been started
about 1993. This new edition, labeled the third, ultimately involved a small
army of forty or more law professors as authors and an executive board
composed primarily of senior scholars in the field.
96
Myriad questions remain. What motivated Cohen to complete this work
that he had initially tried to avoid? Was he motivated even more by the
injustice he felt had occurred at Justice? Would he have worked so diligently
to finish the Handbook otherwise? Would he have worked so hard to produce
such a monumental book if his competence and reputation had not been on the
line? And would he have produced a document so helpful to tribal advocates
if this incident had not occurred? Even setting aside allegations of anti-
Semitism, one cannot help but wonder about broader questions related to
Cohen's work.97 Did Cohen's Jewish identity-and his feelings of being an
outsider to the then-ruling elite in the United States-affect his views about
Indian tribes?
There is ample reason to believe Cohen was the victim of prejudice
throughout his career. The Jewish community faces its own issues related to
assimilation and protecting the right to preserve different cultural values. Was
94. As the McMillen book demonstrates, he also prevailed against Justice in the Hualapai
case. See MAKING INDIAN LAW, supra note 7, at 169.
95. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Rennard Strickland et al. eds.
1982).
96. The Editor-in-Chief was Nell Jessup Newton, who was recently appointed Dean of the
Notre Dame Law School. The author of this review served as one of the authors for the 2005
edition and now serves on the Executive Board of Editors for the ongoing project of updating
the work.
97. There is evidence that Cohen was the victim of anti-Semitism even at the Department
of the Interior. In his private diary, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes said he originally did
not intend to make Cohen the Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs "because [Cohen] was a
Jew." Diary of Harold Ickes 5829-30 (Aug. 9, 1941) (on file at the Library of Congress). Ickes
claims he was blackmailed into it when word got out that this was his reason. Id. Ickes's diary
also reflects that when Cohen's supervisor, Margold, left the Department, Ickes declined to
appoint Cohen "not because [Cohen] isn't a first-rate lawyer, but because of his personality and
his bad public relations. Moreover, I had decided not to appoint a Jew if I could avoid it[.]"
Id. at 6826 (July 19, 1942).
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Cohen concerned about these pressures? Or was he more inclined to seek
assimilation for the Jewish people in the United States and to be able to
thereby raise affirmative complaints about discrimination? Or perhaps there
is a middle ground.
Cohen's most oft-quoted words hauntingly echo the mystery that remains:
[T]he Indian plays much the same role in our American society that
the Jews played in Germany. Like the miner's canary, the Indian
marks the shifts from fresh air to poison gas in our political
atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our
treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our
democratic faith.98
Curiously, the statement sidesteps the undeniable truth that Jewish people also
faced significant challenges in "our American society." Was Cohen more
equipped to assist Indians because he understood some of those challenges as
a Jewish person in the United States? Or did he truly believe the implication
of his own famous quote, that all was well in the United States for Jews?
We find some evidence to answer this question in the McMillen book.
Cohen seems likely to be one who would resist forced assimilation of the
Jewish people. Professor McMillen quotes Cohen as saying that he would be
inclined to "punch ... in the nose" any "would-be reformer" who suggested
that he, as a Jew of Russian descent, "ought to be beneficially assimilated into
the Anglo-Saxon protestant main stream of American life.... .,9
But views on identity and assimilation can be as complicated for Jews as for
American Indians. Architect ofJustice discusses Cohen's identity at length in
the context of the rich Jewish intellectual tradition in which he was reared and
his close, though complicated, relationship with his philosopher father. So
while the biography beautifully illuminates the importance of Cohen's
Jewishness to his views about cultural pluralism, it fails to cast light on the
darker aspects of Cohen's personal experiences as a Jewish-American civil
servant in mid-twentieth century America.
A sense of injustice can be a powerful motivator when it is not debilitating.
Some lawyers draw a certain adrenaline in a righteous battle. It might have
been such righteousness that helped to make the Handbook a tour de force. To
98. Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in
Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953). These words form the inspiration for the title of
an important book. See GERALD TORRES & LANI GUINIER, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING
RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002).
99. MAKING INDIAN LAW, supra note 7, at 170.
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read Cohen's biography, though, one would not know that Cohen faced anti-
Semitism in such a painfully deep and personal way. As the title of the book
suggests, Mitchell places Cohen on a very high pedestal. In many ways, that
honor is deserved, but placing him there may have made it more difficult to
examine him closely and completely. Thus, some of Cohen's mysteries
remain intact.
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